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Transatlantic Relations 
after the Cold War: Theory, 
Evidence, and the Future
John  S. D uffield
One of the more frequent subjects of Richard Ullman’s extensive scholarship 
has been U.S.-European relations. And whether his primary purpose has 
been to analyze the current state of affairs or to prescribe policy to transat­
lantic leaders, he has always proved a perceptive observer and timely com­
mentator. In the early 1980s, he endeavored to plot a route “out of the Eu­
romissile mire” in which NATO had become stuck. Later that decade, he 
illuminated the underlying imperatives for security cooperation that endured 
even among estranged allies through his exposé of the “covert French con­
nection.” As the Cold War began to wind down, he was one of the first to 
grasp the potential opportunities for “enlarging the zone of peace” on the 
continent and “securing Europe” as a whole. And where the rapid consoli­
dation of democratic institutions and liberal values proved elusive, he did 
not flinch from offering a sober assessment of the difficulties faced by the 
West in addressing regional conflagrations, as in his analysis of “the world 
and Yugoslavia’s wars.”
Even this very brief and incomplete survey suggests the considerable im­
pact that Richard Ullman has had on our thinking about the close but often 
conflicted ties shared by the United States and Europe in the postwar era. 
Consequently, it is only fitting on this occasion to take stock of transatlantic 
relations, especially as they have evolved since the end of the Cold War. An 
underlying theme of this chapter is that, although many of the issues have 
changed, especially in the realm of security affairs, the analytical perspec­
tives emphasized by Richard Ullman in his teaching continue to be helpful 
tools for furthering our understanding of the subject.
For some four decades after World War II, transatlantic relations were 
shaped largely by two shared imperatives. Internationally, the imperative of
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containing Soviet power and influence did much to force convergence 
among the foreign policies of the United States and its West European allies. 
Domestically, the imperative of creating jobs and providing rising living stan­
dards generated considerable impetus for the reduction of trade barriers, the 
liberalization of capital flows, and macroeconomic coordination across the 
Atlantic.
During the past decade, however, transatlantic relations have unfolded 
within a rather different context. The first of these imperatives was largely re­
moved by the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
No longer must the United States and Europe coordinate their political-military 
affairs with a constant eye on Moscow. Although the second imperative re­
mains important, its implications for transatlantic relations have become in­
creasingly ambiguous as the West approaches the limits of the benefits of 
economic openness and principled multilateralism.
Consequently, the period since 1990 has been a time of soul-searching in 
U.S.-European relations.1 Fundamental questions have been raised about all 
aspects of transatlantic ties. Will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) be preserved and continue to play an important role in European se­
curity affairs? Specifically, will the United States remain engaged militarily on 
the continent? Will the transatlantic partners continue to enjoy high levels of 
trade, or will they erect ever more barriers to one another’s products amid a 
flurry of mutual recriminations? More generally, will the United States and 
Europe work together to promote common interests, or will they increas­
ingly find themselves at cross purposes?
Needless to say, observers have offered a wide range of answers to these 
questions. Some have adopted a pessimistic stance, arguing that the founda­
tions of postwar transatlantic cooperation have been irrevocably shattered 
by the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 1990; Walt, 1998). Others have 
been much more sanguine, maintaining that those same foundations remain 
largely intact (Kahler, 1996). And a third school of thought contends that 
while serious fissures have opened up, they can nevertheless be closed 
through concerted effort on both sides of the Atlantic, should the will to do 
so exist (Gompert and Larrabee, 1997).
This lack of consensus, while frustrating to those looking for clear-cut an­
swers, should come as no surprise. At bottom, it reflects divergent views 
about the underpinnings of transatlantic cooperation during the Cold War 
and the nature of the post-Cold War world. In order to assess the merits of 
the various positions, therefore, it is necessary to clarify the assumptions on 
which they are based and to spell out logically the implications of those as­
sumptions in ways that enable us to weigh them against the accumulating 
evidence.
A potentially valuable tool for this purpose is the scholarly literature on in­
ternational relations. Much of this work is often zealously scrupulous about
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specifying its assumptions, deriving hypotheses, and, space and resources 
permitting, subjecting the latter to careful empirical tests. Moreover, this lit­
erature contains a range of theories that either have been previously applied 
to questions of transatlantic relations or hold out the promise of helping us 
to understand them.
In fact, the application of international relations theory to post-Cold War 
transatlantic relations promises to be of benefit to scholars and policy mak­
ers alike. For members of the academy, the recent history of U.S.-European 
interactions offers a useful laboratoiy for evaluating and, if necessary, refin­
ing theories that purport to explain patterns of interstate cooperation and 
conflict. Indeed, a handful of scholarly works have tried to do just that (e.g., 
Haftendorn and Tuschhoff, 1993; Peterson, 1993 and 1996; Featherstone and 
Ginsberg, 1996; Guay, 1999).
For their part, members of the policy community can profit from such an 
exercise in at least two related ways. First, theory can suggest the types of de­
velopments that are more or less likely to occur. As a result, policy makers 
can focus their attention on more plausible scenarios. The following analy­
sis shows, for example, that the more pessimistic assessments of transatlantic 
relations are exaggerated. A significant decline in U.S.-European cooperation 
is not inevitable. Rather, solid theoretical grounds exist for concluding that a 
high degree of cooperation will remain possible well into the future. Never­
theless, the glue that bound the United States and Europe together during the 
Cold War is not as strong as it once was. Consequently, leaders who value a 
strong Atlantic partnership cannot afford to become complacent but must be 
pro-active in seeking to manage the relationship.
This conclusion raises the question of what types of steps should be taken, 
and once again, theory can help to provide some of the answers. By priori­
tizing the underlying causes of events, theory suggests where policy makers 
should concentrate their efforts. The following analysis underscores the im­
portant roles that international institutions play in transatlantic relations and 
thus the need to be attentive to their possibilities and limitations. Another 
finding concerns the stabilizing impact that flows of goods, investments, 
people, and ideas across the Atlantic can have where these promote the de­
velopment of better understanding, common values and interests, and even 
mutual identification.
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into three parts. It first introduces three 
leading theoretical perspectives on international relations— the realist, the 
liberal, and what I term the transformational— and asks how each approach 
would expect U.S.-European relations to evolve after the Cold War. It then 
evaluates the usefulness of each perspective for accounting for the actual 
pattern of transatlantic relations since 1990. To what degree do the events of 
the past decade lend support to each of the three perspectives? In the third 
part of the chapter, I draw on the preceding analysis to reflect on the likely
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future course of transatlantic relations and, where possible, to offer theoret­
ically grounded prescriptions for their successful management in the next 
decade and beyond.
Before proceeding, it may be useful to make explicit some of the limita­
tions of the following analysis. In the first place, the portrait I intend to pres­
ent will perforce take the form of broad brush strokes rather than a highly 
detailed rendering of transatlantic relations. To accomplish much more in a 
single chapter would be impossible. Consequently, some of the specific 
events of the past decade may seem to fit poorly with the interpretation pro­
vided. By the same token, the predictions and policy prescriptions offered 
below must necessarily be pitched at a high level of generality. Second, it is 
probably still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the subject. 
Some important consequences of the end of the Cold War may not yet be 
fully manifest. This possibility should serve only as a reason for caution, 
however, not as a justification for deferring consideration of the topic. 
Rather, it is incumbent on scholars to use the analytical tools at their disposal 
to make informed judgments about such matters in a timely manner, even as 
they acknowledge the provisional nature of their findings.
ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES AND THEIR EXPECTATIONS
Theories are useful tools for making sense of the world. They help us to gain 
our bearings in the face of an often dizzying array of “facts” by providing 
conceptual frameworks for ordering and selecting among those facts. At a 
minimum, a theory should provide a map of the most important features of 
the structure underlying the phenomena we wish to understand as well as an 
indication of the relationships between those features and the processes that 
connect them. In this way, it enables us to focus our attention on a relatively 
small number of factors that may be particularly important in determining 
the trajectories and outcomes in which we are interested.
International relations scholars have articulated a number of distinct theo­
ries for explaining patterns of interstate cooperation and conflict. Indeed, to 
the uninitiated, the diversity of specific theoretical approaches present in the 
literature may seem bewildering. Nevertheless, most can be grouped into a 
relatively small number of theoretical perspectives that reflect common as­
sumptions about the nature of the most important actors and causal factors 
in world politics.
Three theoretical perspectives— the realist, the liberal, and what I term the 
transformational— hold particular promise as tools for understanding transat­
lantic relations after the Cold War. As I will argue below, no single perspec­
tive— and certainly no single theory—is able to account for all important as­
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pects of the subject, especially one so complex and multifaceted. Each per­
spective offers valuable insights. But some are clearly more useful than others.
The Realist Perspective: Power and Threats
Perhaps the most commonly invoked theoretical perspective on interna­
tional relations is realism. The term “realism” has been used to describe a 
number of specific theories, not all of which are compatible with one an­
other. Despite such differences, however, most realist theories share a com­
mon set of basic assumptions (Mearsheimer, 1994/95; Waltz, 1979): that the 
main actors in international relations are sovereign states whose most funda­
mental motive is to ensure their own survival; that most states have the abil­
ity to inflict physical harm on and, in some instances, to destroy one another; 
that the basic organizing principle of the international system is anarchy;2 and 
that states can never be certain about the intentions or capabilities of others.
The most important consequence following from these assumptions is that 
states are fundamentally insecure. The use of force is always possible in re­
lations among them, and every state is a potential— if not an actual—-threat 
to every other state, although some are more threatening than others. Con­
sequently, “governments worry a lot about security and pay close attention 
to potential threats” (Walt, 1998:8).
Two variants of realism are particularly relevant to the question of transat­
lantic relations after the Cold War: balance of power theory and hegemonic 
stability theory. Both offer pessimistic predictions, in the form of declining 
cooperation and increasing conflict between the United States and Europe.
B a lan ce o f  P ow er Theory
Balance of power theory argues that states will seek to balance the power 
of threatening states.3 In order to do so, states will sometimes undertake uni­
lateral balancing efforts. Where two or more states perceive a common 
threat, however, they may engage in various forms of military cooperation, 
including but not limited to forming a military alliance. The existence of a 
common threat may also promote economic cooperation, since the eco­
nomic benefits that accrue to either ally will enhance their combined power. 
Conversely, the decline and, especially, the disappearance of the common 
threat will undermine the basis for both types of cooperation. Military coop­
eration will no longer be perceived as necessary, while economic coopera­
tion may be viewed as dangerous, depending on the distribution of benefits, 
since an erstwhile partner might be able to convert its economic gains into 
greater relative military power (Grieco, 1988).
Balance of power theory explains postwar transatlantic relations, espe­
cially its cooperative aspects, as a response to the commonly perceived Soviet
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threat. The military power and expansionist ideology of the Soviet Union 
prompted the United States and Western Europe to form what was arguably 
the most highly developed peacetime military alliance in history— NATO— 
and to engage in high levels of economic cooperation. Whatever conflicts 
might have existed between them were overshadowed by the need to main­
tain a united front.
From this perspective, however, the collapse of the Soviet Union, by elim­
inating the overriding common interest, should have deleterious conse­
quences for transatlantic cooperation. First, the United States and its Euro­
pean partners should perceive little to be gained from continued 
participation in NATO while feeling ever more acutely the restrictions on 
state autonomy imposed by alliance membership. Thus we should not ex­
pect NATO to outlive the Cold War by long (Mearsheimer, 1990; Williams et 
al., 1993; Harries, 1994). Moreover, the United States and Europe should be­
come increasingly concerned about the relative gains of economic coopera­
tion to the degree that each now represents the other’s greatest potential 
strategic rival. As a result, we should also expect growing transatlantic con­
flict in economic affairs (Asmus, 1997; Walt, 1998/99; Bergsten, 1999).
To be sure, some realists have appended caveats to this scenario. The for­
mer Soviet threat, while greatly reduced, might nevertheless provide suffi­
cient glue to hold the alliance together, at least in the medium term, given 
Russia’s nuclear capabilities and unpredictable politics (Duffield, 1994/95). 
Alternatively, other commonly perceived threats, such as terrorism or nu­
clear proliferation, might suffice to fill, at least in part, the void created by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and serve as a basis for continued transatlantic 
security cooperation. Nevertheless, the general thrust of balance of power 
theory is pessimistic for U.S.-European relations.
H egem onic Stability Theory
A second variant of realism, hegemonic stability theory, is hardly more op­
timistic about the prospects for enduring transatlantic cooperation, albeit for 
a different set of reasons. In contrast to balance of power theory, hegemonic 
stability theory seeks primarily to explain patterns of economic relations. It 
nevertheless shares with balance of power theory a healthy skepticism about 
the prospects for cooperation. Also like balance of power theory, it identifies 
a set of circumstances in which the usual hurdles can be overcome.
For hegemonic stability theory, however, these circumstances involve not 
the presence of a common threat but that of a singularly dominant, or hege­
monic, power. Through a combination of threats and promises, a hegemon, 
can induce— or coerce— smaller states to open their markets and, more gen­
erally, to adhere to common rules of commercial intercourse. By the same 
token, a declining hegemon will find it increasingly difficult to elicit such be­
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havior, and previously established cooperative economic arrangements will 
tend to break down (Keohane, 1980).
Hegemonic stability theory has been invoked to account for the ups and 
downs of the postwar Western economic order, especially its transatlantic 
component. Following World War II, the United States, which had emerged 
as the dominant power in the world, spearheaded the creation of a new set 
of arrangements for the governance of international trade and financial rela­
tions. Although these arrangements corresponded closely with American 
preferences at the time, they nevertheless served the interests of most of the 
other noncommunist developed countries. As the relative power of the 
United States began to decline in the 1960s and, especially, the 1970s, how­
ever, the postwar economic order was subjected to a series of shocks that 
threatened to bring the whole edifice crashing down (Keohane, 1980).
In terms of hegemonic stability theory, the end of the Cold War per se has 
no clear consequences for transatlantic relations. It may nevertheless coin­
cide with a continuation, if not an acceleration, of America’s relative decline. 
Not only have the countries of the European Union taken important steps to­
ward economic integration and the creation of an economic power on par 
with the United States, but other dynamic market economies, notably those 
of East Asia, have emerged to pose serious challenges to U.S. ascendancy. In 
such circumstances, the United States should be even less willing to shoul­
der burdens of international leadership and less able to elicit behavior on the 
part of others in accordance with established rules, with predictably negative 
consequences for the stability of the postwar economic order (Sandholtz et 
al., 1992; Thurow, 1992; Bergsten, 1999).
The Liberal Perspective: Institutions and Values
Not all of international relations theory offers such pessimistic views of 
transatlantic relations after the Cold War. A second leading theoretical per­
spective, what is often called “liberalism,” is much more positive about the 
prospects for continued cooperation between the United States and Europe. 
Liberal theories are not inattentive to the role of power and threats in shap­
ing state behavior and international outcomes. They insist, nevertheless, that 
international relations are far more than a rough-and-tumble scramble 
among states for physical security. Two principal liberal approaches in par­
ticular promise to speak to the question of transatlantic relations after the 
Cold War: institutional theory and liberal democratic peace theory.
Institu tional Theory
Institutional theory, as developed perhaps most fully in the work of 
Robert Keohane and his associates, shares a number of important features
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with realism. Like realism, it views states as the most important actors in 
world affairs, treating them as largely unitary and rational. Similarly, it re­
gards domestic politics as relatively inconsequential.
In contrast to most variants of realism, however, this liberal approach as­
signs considerable importance to international institutions. Institutional the­
ory starts from the premise that international relations are characterized by 
numerous situations in which states could in principle achieve considerable 
joint gains through concerted action but are often in practice prevented from 
doing so because of transaction costs, uncertainty, fears of cheating, and 
other obstacles to cooperation. Where such obstacles exist, however, states 
can overcome them in order to realize the potential gains through the cre­
ation of international institutions designed to lower transaction costs, reduce 
uncertainty, deter cheating, and so on (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Martin, 
1995).
Once such institutions are established, participating states have strong in­
centives to maintain them and to comply with the rules they contain. The 
preservation of international institutions ensures the continuation of the ben­
efits that they were originally intended to produce. Even when conditions 
change and an established institution becomes less than ideal, participants 
may find that it is difficult to construct superior institutional alternatives or 
that the short-term costs of doing so outweigh the discounted present value 
of anticipated gains. Moreover, it may be easier to adapt existing institutions 
to meet new needs than to build new ones from the ground up. Only where 
an institution becomes clearly dysfunctional will it be rational for member 
states to cease to participate.
From the perspective of institutional theory, the end of the Cold War need 
not spell the demise of transatlantic cooperation. In the security arena, post­
war U.S.-European relations were conducted largely within the context of 
NATO. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union itself clearly deprived the alliance of one of its most compelling ratio­
nales. But deterrence and defense against external aggression did not con­
stitute NATO’s only purpose, and others, such as stabilizing relations among 
the states of Europe, have attained new prominence with the decline of the 
former Soviet threat (Duffield, 1994/95). It could be expected, moreover, that 
NATO members would attempt to use such a highly developed and capable 
organizational structure to address any new challenges that might arise in the 
region, if not further afield (McCalla, 1996).
The implications of institutional theory for transatlantic economic relations 
are less clear, given that the United States and Europe established few pri­
marily transatlantic institutions to govern their interactions in this area dur­
ing the Cold War. Nevertheless, the transatlantic partners were the principal 
architects of and the major players in the broader Western institutional struc­
tures created after World War II to promote economic cooperation, such as
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Mon­
etary Fund (IMF), and, later, the Group of Seven (G-7). Thus insofar as these 
institutions continue to represent valuable tools for pursuing U.S. and Euro­
pean economic interests and coping with global economic difficulties, one 
should expect continued compliance with their dictates even as individual 
states seek to modify their functions, structures, and rules in order to better 
suit the states’ current needs.
L iberal D em ocratic P eace Theory
Liberal democratic peace theory represents an even greater departure 
from the tenets of realism. In particular, it rejects the assumption that states 
can be treated as unitary actors, contending instead that due attention must 
be given to the individuals and private associations that constitute society, 
the values they hold, and the domestic institutions that serve to aggregate 
their value-based preferences into state policy (Moravcsik, 1997).
Liberal democratic peace theory has been developed over the past decade 
and a half to explain a striking empirical anomaly: the fact that no two lib­
eral democracies have ever gone to war with each other. To account for this 
phenomenon, international relations scholars have advanced two comple­
mentary theoretical arguments concerning the roles of democratic political 
institutions and liberal values, respectively (Doyle, 1986; Owen, 1994). Dem­
ocratic political institutions can make it difficult for a state to move toward 
war until it is sorely provoked. The existence of a free press and open pub­
lic debate can make it harder for leaders to act in secrecy. Regular, competi­
tive elections ensure that those same leaders can be held accountable for 
their actions and thus punished if they resort to war without good reason or 
public support. And the distribution of foreign policy decision-making au­
thority among multiple bodies or individuals means that steps toward war 
will be slower and more cumbersome.
The presence of such domestic institutions is no guarantee of pacific be­
havior, however. Not only have democracies participated in wars with no 
less frequency overall than their authoritarian counterparts, but they have 
sometimes even initiated military conflicts. Thus it is also important to con­
sider how these institutional effects can be reinforced by liberal values. Lib­
eral societies place a high intrinsic value on each individual and his or her 
well-being. Typically, this value is accompanied by a depreciation of war as 
a means of progress, given its potentially high cost in human terms, except 
where the use of force may be required to ensure the community’s security 
or, in extreme cases, to preserve liberty and justice. Instead, liberal societies 
exhibit a strong preference for peaceful methods of resolving disputes and 
regulating competition. A further consequence is that societies marked by 
liberal values will have a special affinity for one another. They tend to regard
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each other as fundamentally just and peaceful and thus deserving of accom­
modation, whereas illiberal states will be viewed as hostile and potential 
threats (Doyle, 1986).
Arguably, the contribution of liberal democratic peace theory to under­
standing transatlantic relations during the Cold War is relatively small. The 
United States and Western Europe had good reason to cooperate with one 
another when confronted with the power and expansionist ideology of the 
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, liberal democratic peace theory may help to ex­
plain why the transatlantic partners came together so readily and why they 
cooperated so extensively, creating institutions (like NATO) without prece­
dent (Risse-Kappen, 1996). It also helps to account for the limits they placed 
on security and, especially, economic cooperation with illiberal states such 
as Greece, Spain, and Portugal until the 1970s and 1980s.
The expectations of liberal democratic peace theory for transatlantic rela­
tions after the Cold War are similarly indefinite. While this approach may pre­
dict the absence of military conflict between the United States and Europe, it 
cannot forecast with any precision the forms of active cooperation in which 
they are likely to engage. Perhaps the most that can be said at this point is that 
they should possess a shared interest in preserving democratic institutions and 
liberal values at home and promoting their spread abroad where possible.
The Transformational Perspective:
Changes in Beliefs, Interests, and Identities
The third theoretical perspective that I will consider, what I term the 
“transformational,” is derived from the broader set of theories that seek to 
explain international relations and state behavior in terms of ideational fac­
tors, such as belief systems, images, cognitive maps, collective identity, and 
culture. The term transformational is intended to distinguish those theories 
that emphasize the protean nature of the beliefs, values, interests, and even 
the identities of the actors in international relations and call for more atten­
tion to how and why such ideational phenomena may change over time. As 
such, transformational approaches share liberalism’s critique of realism and 
build on the insights of the former, especially its emphasis on the role of val­
ues.4 At the same time, however, they implicitly criticize liberalism—and 
other existing idea-based theories— for offering too static a picture of world 
politics.
L earn ing Theory a n d  S ocial Constructivism
The two most prominent transformational approaches are learning theory 
and social constructivism. Learning theory, which was the first to be devel­
oped, is just what it claims to be: a theory of what and how actors— typically
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individual policy makers— learn from experience, observation, and study. In 
its most basic form, it concerns any changes in the beliefs and values held by 
these individuals rather than connoting some form of human progress; learn­
ing can be maladaptive and dysfunctional as well as productive and benefi­
cial (Levy, 1994).
Scholars have typically differentiated between two types of learning. Sim­
ple learning involves changes in factual knowledge and cause-effect beliefs. 
This type of learning is manifested when actors alter the strategies they em­
ploy to achieve a fixed set of goals. Complex learning, in contrast, involves 
changes in values, interests, and the basic goals of policy themselves. Thus 
this second type of learning may result in even more profound behavioral 
modifications (Nye, 1987).
Social constructivism, which borrows heavily from modern social theory, 
requires a bit more explication. The starting point of constructivist analyses 
is the assumption that the agents in any social system are not autonomous 
but, rather, are embedded in social structures of shared norms that do much 
to define their interests and identities. Such arrangements of agents and 
structures are not static but evolve over time through a process of mutual 
constitution: the actions (physical and communicative) of agents shape and 
reshape the normative structures, which simultaneously constitute and re­
constitute the agents (Wendt, 1995 and 1999).
The intensity of such transformational processes can vary considerably, al­
though most social constructivists would maintain that they are always pres­
ent to some degree. What is important for our purposes, however, is the idea 
that repeated interactions among states and the people who compose them 
can result in changes in their interests and even their identities over time. 
Moreover, this process can easily go beyond the development of comple­
mentary interests and similar identities (e.g., as liberal democratic states) and 
lead instead to the emergence of common interests and a common identity 
(e.g., as an Atlantic community), an identity that could perhaps even serve 
as the basis for the construction of a new polity and that might exclude oth­
erwise similar states located elsewhere.
In addition, there are good reasons to expect that the types of transforma­
tional phenomena posited by learning theory and constructivism will occur 
with particular frequency in the context of formal international institutions. 
Membership in such institutions is likely to alter the nature of interstate and 
transnational interactions in ways that facilitate the processes of interest and 
identity formation. Other things being equal, interactions among the indi­
viduals that represent participating states and various unofficial actors are 
likely to be of greater frequency, intensity, density, and duration than those 
among nonmembers. This effect should be characteristic of a wide variety of 
types of interactions, including direct human contacts, the establishment of 
transnational and transgovernmental links, information flows, and resource
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transfers (Risse-Kappen, ed., 1995). Thus although institutionalist theory and 
social constructivism start from very different premises, international institu­
tions should play a prominent role in many constructivist accounts of inter­
national relations.
H ypotheses abou t T ransatlantic R elations
The transformational perspective is perhaps the least useful for ex­
plaining transatlantic relations during the Cold War (Risse-Kappen, 1995). 
What it would emphasize during that period is not the impact of accumu­
lating changes in beliefs, interests, and identities but the very occurrence 
of such changes in the context of frequent and highly institutionalized 
transatlantic interactions. Since ideational changes of this type are likely to 
be gradual in nature, their behavioral consequences should require some 
time to emerge.
The post-Cold War era, however, is probably not too early a period in 
which to expect such consequences to become manifest. Thus transforma­
tional approaches would suggest that, independently of the continued exis­
tence of common threats, interlinking international institutions, and shared 
liberal democratic traditions, transatlantic relations after the Cold War should 
be different from what they might otherwise have become because of fun­
damental changes in the nature of the United States and the European coun­
tries, or at least in the beliefs and values held by their elites, mass publics, or 
both (Wendt, 1992:417-418).
The exact nature of the likely impact of such changes on U.S.-European 
relations is harder to specify; it depends crucially on the precise ways in 
which— and the degree to which—beliefs, values, interests, and identities 
have evolved under the impact of transatlantic interactions over the previous 
four decades. As a working hypothesis, however, one might posit, for ex­
ample, the existence of altered beliefs (especially in the United States) about 
the interdependence of U.S. and European security and thus the value of 
continued American engagement in European security affairs. Closely re­
lated might be convergent transatlantic interests in European peace and sta­
bility, and not only because of the corresponding economic benefits. And 
some scholars have gone so far as to claim the emergence of a transatlantic 
security community based on a common identity (Risse-Kappen, 1995). Such 
developments would militate strongly in favor of a high level of continued 
cooperation, perhaps especially in the area of security.
WEIGHING THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
Three leading theoretical perspectives offer often contrasting expectations 
about the likely course of transatlantic relations after the Cold War. How do
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these expectations hold up against the empirical record since 1990? Although 
even a decade of experience is perhaps too short a period on which to base 
firm conclusions about so broad a subject, it should provide us at least with 
some indication of likely trends.
Before attempting to draw any conclusions, however, it is important to 
make note of the most obvious difficulties that will attend such an effort. 
Three related problems stand out. First, a good deal of uncertainty exists 
regarding the expectations of each theory. In order to make more accurate 
predictions, it is necessary to have more detailed descriptions of the 
causal antecedents that each approach emphasizes. Concrete realist hy­
potheses are likely to be the easiest to generate, since the configurations 
of power and threat that they emphasize are relatively easy to specify, al­
though, in fact, subjective perceptions of them may vary considerably. In 
contrast, the task of ascertaining the beliefs, interests, and identities 
stressed by transformational theories may be quite demanding and fraught 
with pitfalls.
Second, even if the achievement of greater specificity were possible, the 
various theories considered above would not necessarily offer rival hy­
potheses. Thus the same phenomena may provide support for more than 
one approach. The task of differentiating between the outcomes predicted 
by the liberal and transformational perspectives, respectively, will be espe­
cially challenging. Nevertheless, it should be relatively easy to distinguish 
between the generally pessimistic expectations about transatlantic coopera­
tion of realist theories and the more optimistic ones of their liberal and trans­
formational counterparts.
Third, even where hypotheses can be clearly differentiated and where ev­
idence seems to be consistent with the expectations of one theory or an­
other, it may be difficult to establish with any certainty that the causal factors 
emphasized by that theory were indeed responsible for the observed out­
come. In any case, to do so with a high degree of confidence would require 
a much more detailed examination of the evidence than is possible within 
the confines of a single chapter, since one may need to inquire into the mo­
tives and calculations of multiple decision makers. Here, it will be possible 
only to examine the broad contours of transatlantic relations since 1990 and 
not to delve into primary sources.
With these caveats in mind, I now evaluate the usefulness of the three per­
spectives for understanding the recent evolution of U.S.-European relations. 
How should one go about doing so? Each of the theories considered above 
purports to explain the presence or absence of cooperation among states. 
Consequently, one should begin by looking for evidence of transatlantic co­
operation. International cooperation has been usefully defined as “the vol­
untary adjustment by states of their policies so that they manage their differ­
ences and reach some mutually beneficial outcome” (Grieco, 1990:22; see 
also Keohane, 1984:51-52). With this broad definition as a starting point, one
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might further distinguish among three more specific forms of cooperation in 
situations where policy preferences diverge:
• Making an effort to address common challenges or problems jointly, 
rather than acting independently. In some cases, this will involve using 
appropriate preexisting institutional fora.
• Exhibiting a willingness to compromise one’s preferred course of action 
in order to achieve common policies. In some cases, this will entail the 
creation of new institutional structures or the modification of existing 
ones.
• Faithfully implementing common policies, even where this involves 
some cost or inconvenience in comparison with unilateral action. In 
some cases, this will involve complying with agreed institutional rules.
In conducting this analysis, consider first the security and then the economic 
aspects of the subject. Although this organizational structure is somewhat ar­
bitrary and, more importantly, may obscure important links between the two 
components and tend to marginalize other significant aspects of transatlantic 
relations, it is nevertheless common in the literature and thus should facili­
tate comparison with other works.
Transatlantic Security Relations
The post-Cold War record in the area of security affairs provides consider­
able support for the liberal and transformational perspectives. Despite a 
number of episodes involving strained transatlantic ties, many of which 
seemed to confirm realist expectations, the United States and Europe have 
continued to engage in high levels of security cooperation. Along the way, 
they have transformed NATO into an institution that is better able to address 
their likely future security concerns in the region and thus can serve as a 
sturdy platform for joint action. Harder to establish is the role of transforma­
tional processes in accounting for these and related developments.
E vidence o f  C ooperation a n d  C onflict
To be sure, many developments in the early to mid-1990s suggested that 
the realist dynamic of alliance disintegration would prevail in transatlantic 
security relations. As the Soviet threat declined, NATO countries engaged in 
rapid, largely unilateral force reductions and troop withdrawals, raising 
questions about the viability of the alliance’s integrated military structure. Si­
multaneously, a number of European states, including many NATO mem­
bers, expressed an interest in developing strong pan-European and/or West 
European security structures, suggesting that the old alliance with the United
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States was no longer deemed necessary or at least that the U.S. role in Eu­
rope could be significantly reduced.
In addition, NATO was almost immediately buffeted by challenges of a dif­
ferent nature, which placed in stark relief the question of the alliance’s con­
tinued relevance to the problems of European security after the Cold War. 
These challenges stemmed from the allies’ differing responses to the con­
flicts that wracked the former Yugoslavia, beginning in mid-1991- Initially, of 
course, the desire of the Europeans to take the lead in dealing with the con­
flicts and U.S. willingness to defer to them resulted in a brief period of 
transatlantic harmony. The failure of these European efforts as well as those 
of the United Nations to put an end to the fighting and the concomitant 
recognition of the need for NATO involvement, however, soon brought U.S.- 
European differences to a head. One result was the early impasse triggered 
by the American proposal for a policy of “lift and strike” in Bosnia, which 
found little support on the continent. Such episodes of paralysis generated 
in turn a chorus of cries, especially in the United States, that NATO either had 
to go “out of area” or it would go out of business. And even where the allies 
could agree in principle to act, as on the policy of enforcing the U.N.- 
declared no-fly-zone over Bosnia, they frequently clashed publicly over the 
precise measures to be taken in response to violations. Clearly, the nature of 
the threat posed by ethnic conflict in the Balkans was not sufficient to com­
pel a unified front (Ullman, 1996).
At approximately the same time, the NATO allies began to disagree openly 
over the desirability of admitting new members from Central and Eastern Eu­
rope. Although perhaps never as heated as the intra-alliance debates over 
what to do about Bosnia, the enlargement issue nevertheless further mani­
fested the fissiparous tendencies existing within the alliance after the Cold 
War. Indeed, one realist has described it as the clearest sign of an eroding 
strategic consensus (Walt, 1998:19)-
When all is said and done, however, it is clear that no fundamental break­
down has occurred in transatlantic security cooperation. To the contrary, the 
United States and Europe have continued to try to work together on regional 
security issues and have usually been able to overcome their differences in 
order to arrive at and carry out common policies. NATO has been not only 
preserved but substantially modified, both doctrinally and structurally, in or­
der to be better able to address the likely challenges of the future. As a re­
sult, it remains a central—and, in many cases, the central— focus of the se­
curity policies of its members. Indeed, even France, which severed its 
military ties to the alliance in the 1960s, has seen fit to involve itself once 
again in NATO’s defense bodies.
Likewise, the early concerns raised by the prospect of alternative Euro­
pean security structures turned out to be misplaced. Less progress has oc­
curred than many had initially hoped or feared, in no small part because of
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the transatlantic alliance’s continuing utility. And insofar as new structures 
have been established, they have been increasingly viewed as complemen­
tary to rather than competing with NATO, which has itself taken steps, such 
as the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, to 
ensure their mutual compatibility.
Finally, the United States and the Europeans were able to work through 
their most important initial differences on the question of enlargement in the 
span of a few years, paving the way for the admission of three new members 
from Central and Eastern Europe in 1999- Likewise, they were ultimately able 
to achieve a high level of cooperation in Bosnia, beginning with the en­
forcement of U.N. sanctions in the mid-1990s and continuing through a half 
decade-long deployment of peacekeeping forces there. The Bosnia experi­
ence was followed by a much less contentious process of decision making 
and joint military action in response to the subsequent crisis in Kosovo, 
notwithstanding the lack of a clear U.N. mandate.
A ccounting fo r  C ooperation
More difficult than describing this generally cooperative pattern of out­
comes is the task of accounting for it in terms of the three theoretical per­
spectives outlined above. Even realists—never ones to concede a point 
readily—might argue that, notwithstanding the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the United States and Western Europe faced common threats of sufficient 
magnitude to ensure continued security cooperation. In the face of a nuclear 
armed Russia, actual and potential ethnic conflicts on their borders, and the 
new risks posed by proliferation and terrorism, the allies may not yet have 
been ready to go their separate ways. In terms of the material factors em­
phasized by realism, however, it is hard to see why the United States pos­
sesses a stronger interest in institutionalized security cooperation with Eu­
rope than it did, say, during the interwar years or immediately after World 
War II, both occasions on which it sought to disengage. And even if U.S. en­
gagement were not problematic, the particular form that transatlantic coop­
eration has taken—the preservation of NATO—and the ways in which the 
organization has been used are not readily accounted for by balance of 
power theory.
Instead, the trajectory of post-Cold War transatlantic security relations 
seems less puzzling when viewed through the lenses provided by the liberal 
and transformational perspectives. Institutional theorists can explain NATO’s 
persistence in terms of the utility and adaptability of existing international in­
stitutions. Even if the nature of the security challenges facing the United 
States and Europe changed, as they did to a significant extent, it was always 
more efficient to rely on NATO and to make organizational adjustments as 
necessary than to react to events on an ad hoc basis. Thus an alliance that
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had once emphasized the deterrence of threats and acts of aggression against 
its members has been employed to stabilize and promote reform in the states 
of Central and Eastern Europe and, where actual hostilities occurred, to co­
ordinate international military interventions for the purposes of peacekeep­
ing and peace enforcement. Indeed, all of these operations would have been 
much more difficult, if not impossible, to mount in the absence of NATO’s 
organizational machinery. With the acquisition of experience and the devel­
opment of new capabilities, moreover, such new cooperative ventures could 
be undertaken with ever greater speed, confidence, and efficiency— com­
pare NATO’s responses to the Bosnian and Kosovo crises, respectively.
The other strand of liberalism considered in this chapter, liberal demo­
cratic peace theory, would emphasize the specific types of strategies jointly 
employed by the United States and Western Europe to enhance their security 
after the Cold War. The allies were not content simply to wall themselves off 
from potential dangers, to engage in military cooperation with nonmembers 
insofar as possible, or to extinguish regional military conflicts. To the con­
trary, they have placed at least as much emphasis on transforming former ad­
versaries into fully fledged members of the community of liberal, democratic 
states. Thus the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (now the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council), the Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the NATO en­
largement process concerned not only the creation of new security ties but 
also the export of Western models of civil-military relations, transparent de­
fense policy making, treatment of national minorities, and the like. Likewise, 
the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo have been closely linked to the goal 
of constructing political communities based on the principles of tolerance 
and representative government in those devastated regions.
Harder to establish is the impact of the types of factors emphasized by 
transformational perspectives, although this difficulty should not discourage 
us from looking for their influences. It would be an exaggeration to state that 
the United States and Europe have developed a common identity that could 
serve as a solid foundation for cooperation— indeed, such a claim would be 
premature even in the case of the members of the much more integrated Eu­
ropean Union— although the first elements of such a transatlantic identity 
may be present. Even where American and European security interests seem 
to have coincided, moreover, it would be reckless without much more care­
ful analysis to attribute such coincidences wholly to earlier interactive 
processes rather than to the common strategic circumstances of the moment.
Nevertheless, we can adduce at least some evidence for the existence of 
transformational phenomena in the rationales offered by political leaders for 
the policies that their respective states have pursued. These include, for ex­
ample, frequent references to the United States as a European power, one 
with a permanent role to play in the security affairs of the continent (Hol­
brooke, 1995). Today, such views, which would have found few adherents
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following either of the world wars, seem much more than just wishful think­
ing. By the same token, very few American elites today regard renewed iso­
lationism as a responsible option.
Perhaps even more striking have been the justifications provided by polit­
ical leaders in Germany, which is arguably the European linchpin of transat­
lantic security cooperation. The Federal Republic, more than any other Eu­
ropean state, has been transformed by its participation in NATO and its close 
relations with the United States during the postwar era. Consequently, suc­
cessive German governments of varying political stripes have been ardent 
supporters of the alliance and continued strong security ties with the United 
States, including an American military presence on German soil, to an extent 
that seems to exceed even what can be rationalized in terms of the expected 
practical benefits of such a policy (Duffield, 1998).
Finally, one might point to evidence of ongoing learning since the end of 
the Cold War with regard to how to respond to ethnic conflict in the Balkans 
and perhaps elsewhere on the continent. Having started at different posi­
tions, the transatlantic partners now appear to have arrived at a consensus 
about the importance of timely intervention, the need for American leader­
ship, and the utility of NATO. These altered beliefs no less than the institu­
tional changes that have occurred in the alliance are necessary for explain­
ing the differing Western responses to fighting in Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo. In a similar manner, U.S. and European views about the meaning 
and value of European efforts to develop an autonomous capability for mil­
itary action have exhibited considerable convergence.
Transatlantic Economic Relations
A similar pattern of outcomes and influences would seem to obtain in the 
area of transatlantic economic relations since the end of the Cold War. Here, 
too, one finds some empirical support for the increasingly conflictual dy­
namics predicted by realism. The preponderance of evidence, however, 
points in the direction of a liberal interpretation. Whether transformational 
processes have played much of a role is more difficult to say.
E vidence o f  C ooperation  a n d  C onflict
As realists might have anticipated, U.S.-European economic relations have 
been characterized by a number of high-profile disputes, especially in the 
area of trade. Whether the issue was bananas, hormone-treated beef, and 
Hollywood movies or more arcane subject like export subsidies and the ex­
traterritorial application of American sanctions, such disputes have made 
headlines and raised concerns that transatlantic commercial ties might soon 
be strained to the breaking point. And at the beginning of the 1990s, the
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Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations came close to collapse, largely 
due to transatlantic differences.
Yet the overall record of transatlantic economic relations is one of contin­
ued cooperation, notwithstanding attention-getting disagreements. The 
United States and Europe have continued to try to work together on eco­
nomic issues, seeking amicable solutions to their conflicts. These efforts 
have included the creation and elaboration of formal arrangements between 
the United States and the European Union (EU) for the bilateral discussion of 
nonsecurity issues, including biannual summits at the presidential level, as 
called for in the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration (Kahler, 1995: 6 l; Reinicke, 
1996: 42-43; Eichengreen, 1998: 1).
With regard to the area of trade, one should also remember that high- 
profile disputes are not a purely post-Cold War phenomenon. To the con­
trary, they have long been a staple irritant of transatlantic relations, even if 
the specific bones of contention have changed over the years. Moreover, im­
portant past objects of conflict, such as strategic trade with the Soviet bloc, 
access to resources in the developing world, and the protection of agricul­
ture, have been diminished with the end of the Cold War, a steady decline in 
the price of most commodities, and significant reforms in the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Kahler, 1995: 2-3).
What really matters, in any case, is the broader impact of such disputes, 
and this impact appears to have been modest, if not negligible. Disputes in 
one area have not readily spilled over into others but have remained largely 
contained.5 In absolute terms, moreover, the level of transatlantic trade re­
mains substantial, at around 20 percent of the U.S. total.6
It is also noteworthy that the United States and the EU were ultimately able 
to overcome the deep differences that had obstructed global trade negotia­
tions and to achieve agreements that served as the basis for the successful 
1993 conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which resulted in the establishment 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Not only were the principles gov­
erning trade in manufactured goods extended into new areas, such as ser­
vices and intellectual property rights, but they were supplemented with new 
decision-making bodies and dispute settlement procedures. Since then, the 
two sides have regularly taken their grievances to the WTO and have sought 
to comply with its rulings rather than resorting to unilateral measures in or­
der to obtain redress.
The evidence in the area of monetary relations is more ambiguous. The 
post-Cold War era has seen no major conflicts in this area thus far. Never­
theless, the degree of transatlantic coordination in response to the financial 
crises— first in Mexico, later in Asia—that threatened to bring down the 
global financial system has been less than ideal. Moreover, it is too soon to 
assess the consequences of the establishment of a monetary union among 
eleven European states in 1999 (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 1998).
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A ccounting fo r  C ooperation
To an important extent, it seems possible to account for this general pat­
tern of continued cooperation in terms of the multiple international institu­
tions of relevance to transatlantic economic relations. In contrast to the se­
curity realm, however, many of these institutions are global rather than 
purely regional in nature or, if not global, include one or more extraregional 
states. One important general mechanism for policy coordination has been 
the G-7, to which Japan and Canada belong. Although the G-7 is only loosely 
institutionalized, its annual summit meetings provide a unique forum for the 
discussion of issues and the achievement of consensus among the world’s 
largest industrialized countries. During the first half of the 1990s, the G-7 
served as a principal venue for the coordination of Western assistance to the 
former Soviet Union. With a larger, though still far from universal, member­
ship and a lower profile is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which provided a forum for the negotiation by the 
United States and Europe of an agreement on measures to limit corruption 
by their corporations (Schott, 1998: 59).
The most developed set of international institutions governing transat­
lantic economic relations have been those concerned with trade, especially 
the GATT and its successor organization, the WTO. The existence of these 
complex frameworks of rules and procedures, and the benefits that they 
generate in terms of market access and the regulation of competition, has 
given the United States and Europe additional strong incentives for seeking 
to contain and resolve their differences. Indeed, these global institutions 
have reduced barriers to transatlantic trade to such an extent that relatively 
little would likely be gained from any purely bilateral liberalization mea­
sures, such as a U.S.-EU free trade area in services and industrial goods 
(Schott, 1998: 41).
As for monetary relations, transatlantic cooperation is pursued in a variety 
of international institutions, including the G-7, the OECD, the IMF, and the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS). In contrast to trade, however, this 
realm is characterized by few specific rules and relatively weak mechanisms 
for policy coordination (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 1998). Consequently, 
should serious U.S.-European conflicts ever arise in this area, it may be pos­
sible to attribute them in at least part to the absence of adequate institutional 
arrangements.
The liberal democratic nature of the societies involved may have also 
played a role in promoting transatlantic economic cooperation, albeit a more 
indirect one. On balance, cooperation seems to have been favored by the 
level and nature of economic interdependence that has existed between the 
United States and Europe. While a high volume of trade increases the po­
tential for conflict across the Atlantic (Eichengreen, 1998:1), it also raises the
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stakes, providing both sides with an incentive to make sure that disputes are 
resolved or at least contained. In addition, transatlantic trade is highly bal­
anced, thereby removing a source of rancor that repeatedly roils U.S. rela­
tions with Asia. Finally, cooperation has been undergirded by continuing 
high levels of direct investment, which has a strong positive impact on 
trade.7 Economic interdependence is in turn, however, strongly associated 
with liberal democracy. In particular, recent studies have found that demo­
cratic states trade significantly more with each other than they do with states 
that have other types of political systems (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares, 
1998).
Considerable evidence also suggests that transformational dynamics have 
been present. U.S. and European concepts about the proper ordering of the 
world economy have undergone considerable convergence during the post­
war era. Whereas the United States and its principal European allies were fre­
quently at odds over such issues as imperial preference half a century ago, 
they have developed highly similar, if not always identical, preferences for 
economic openness and market competition (Kahler, 1996; Guay, 1999). 
Whether this convergence can be attributed primarily to the types of 
processes posited by the transformational perspective is harder to establish. 
Nevertheless, at least one perceptive observer has argued that “five decades 
of close collaboration have produced societies on either side of the Atlantic 
that share broadly common views on international economic governance” 
(Kahler, 1996:24).
CONCLUSION: FINDINGS, FUTURE 
PROSPECTS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This chapter has inquired into the usefulness of three leading theoretical per­
spectives for understanding transatlantic relations after the Cold War. It has 
found that realist approaches, while providing a useful starting point for 
analysis, are unable to account for the general pattern of considerable coop­
eration that has continued to characterize relations between the United 
States and Europe in both the security and economic arenas. Balance of 
power theory and hegemonic stability theory both predict a decline in co­
operation as a result of the end of the Soviet threat and American hegemony 
vis-à-vis Europe, respectively.
Instead, the record of the past decade is much more consistent with the 
expectations of liberal theories of international relations. As institutional the­
ory would predict, the strong security and economic institutions created by 
the transatlantic partners in the wake of World War II and in response to the 
Cold War have continued to serve as valuable instruments for addressing
258 Chapter 11
their concerns and pursuing their national interests. As a result, the very ex­
istence of these institutions has both facilitated and generated strong incen­
tives for continued cooperation, even as they have been modified and sup­
plemented to conform better to the exigencies of the post-Cold War era. 
While the predictions of liberal democratic peace theory are not as specific, 
it too is nevertheless compatible with the high degree of cooperation wit­
nessed between the United States and Europe.
Hardest of all to assess is the contribution of the transformational per­
spective to an explanation of transatlantic relations. Certainly, the pattern of 
continued cooperation is not inconsistent with this approach’s emphasis on 
the effects of convergent beliefs, interests, and even identities. Rather, the 
problem lies in establishing with any degree of confidence that such trans­
formational dynamics have indeed occurred and that they can be primarily 
attributed to the interactive processes that transformational approaches pre­
suppose, as opposed to some other (perhaps random) mechanism. This 
problem, however, is not an absolute one but an artifact of the relative nov­
elty of these theoretical approaches, the relatively greater difficulty of mea­
suring the ideational variables that they emphasize (in comparison with 
power distributions or international institutions), and the relatively limited 
resources that scholars have thus far devoted to exploring their validity.
In fact, further research on the subject of transatlantic relations is likely to 
result in new theoretical syntheses in which the transformational perspective 
is treated as an essential complement to realism and liberalism as scholars 
find it increasingly difficult to disentangle the causal processes posited by 
these various approaches. This is because the impact of seemingly objective 
factors such as power and institutions on international relations is necessar­
ily mediated by the perceptions, meanings, and understandings that are at­
tached to them. Thus how one responds, for example, to Germany’s eco­
nomic power and military potential is largely a function of what one might 
expect Germany to do with the resources at its disposal. Likewise, the utility 
of a particular international institution such as NATO is as much a learned or 
imagined quality as it is something that can be straightforwardly divined 
from the organization’s formal structures and processes. Consequently, it 
may ultimately be impossible to understand realist and liberal dynamics ex­
cept through a transformationalist lens that helps to explain how the world 
came to be perceived and understood in a particular way.
A final observation concerns the sufficiency of the theoretical perspectives 
employed in this analysis. While one or more of them may be necessary to 
understand post-Cold War transatlantic relations, they are not necessarily 
able to account, singly or jointly, for all of the events and trends of the past 
decade that one might deem important. Although each of the three perspec­
tives is pitched in broad terms in order to embrace multiple theories, they do 
not by any means encompass all of the theoretical approaches that might be
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of use in this enterprise. Indeed, the very nature of these approaches may 
obscure important features that are essential to a more fully satisfying un­
derstanding of the subject.
As a first step, it may be useful to question the tendency of the preceding 
analysis to treat Europe (or at least Western Europe) as a single entity. Al­
though this assumption is perhaps more reasonable than at any time in the 
past in view of the impressive strides made recently by the EU, the truth re­
mains that the region is populated by a number of distinct nation-states that 
often hold conflicting interests on particular issues. Indeed, these intra- 
European differences may at times be as substantial as those that character­
ize transatlantic relations as a whole. Thus it may be advisable to disaggre­
gate Europe and to explore the additional obstacles and opportunities for co­
operation that such a model suggests.
Going a step further in this direction, it may sometimes be useful to dis­
aggregate the states themselves into their constituent parts, such as govern­
ments, which may in turn be separated into their executive, legislative, and 
judicial components; societies, which may in turn be divided along lines of 
economic interest, class, ethnicity, and so on; and the various institutions of 
interest representation that link the state and society. Such an analytical 
move may help to highlight additional important constraints on or pressures 
for cooperation as well as aid in the process of identifying strategies for over­
coming the former and harnessing the latter.
Both of these departures from the simpler model employed in this chap­
ter suggest the potential relevance of the family of theories that concern the 
primarily domestic sources of foreign and security policy. Indeed, it may be 
impossible to comprehend particular trade disputes or the zig-zagging 
course of allied discussions on the question of NATO enlargement without 
reference to such factors. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin an analysis of this 
type by examining how far theories that consider the transatlantic system as 
a whole, rather than the often idiosyncratic characteristics of its component 
parts, are able to take us.
Future Prospects
What does the preceding analysis suggest about the future course of 
transatlantic relations? Clearly, attempts at political forecasting are fraught 
with potential pitfalls. Often, it is impossible to anticipate developments that 
prove to be primary determinants of future events. Could but Western lead­
ers have foreseen the rise of a national-socialist dictatorship in Germany, the 
world might have been spared a second global conflagration. Likewise, 
those in positions of political power at the end of World War II could hardly 
have imagined the degree to which relations with the Soviet Union would 
deteriorate during the following five years.
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Nevertheless, if one is to prognosticate, one cannot dwell on the unpre­
dictable. And perhaps the best we can do is to project recent trends into the 
future, even as we recognize the possibility of departures from a linear path. 
In that case, the prospects for transatlantic relations are generally bright. We 
can anticipate a continuation of the generally high levels of cooperation be­
tween the United States and Europe that have prevailed during the past 
decade. Such an optimistic forecast also follows from a consideration of the 
factors emphasized by the theoretical perspectives that we have found par­
ticularly useful for illuminating post-Cold War U.S.-European relations thus 
far. The liberal and transformational perspectives provide good grounds, es­
pecially when taken together, for expecting continued cooperation, notwith­
standing the greater potential for conflict, or at least a drifting apart, that the 
realist perspective identifies.
In the first place, the United States and its European partners remain well- 
established liberal democracies that will be naturally inclined to cooperate in 
the many areas in which their interests coincide. And where their interests 
diverge on specific issues, they will tend to evince understanding of each 
other’s positions and to exercise restraint in their dealings with one another, 
placing sharp bounds on the potential for conflict.
In the second place, the United States and Europe remain jointly en­
meshed in a number of well-developed international institutions that simul­
taneously provide opportunities and good reasons for continued collabora­
tion. Most of those that were created during the Cold War have been 
successfully adapted, like NATO, so as to maintain their relevance in the face 
of new international realities and in some cases, such as the WTO, given ad­
ditional powers. Moreover, some new ones, including the first purely transat­
lantic arrangements for the discussion of political and economic issues, have 
been established. Although these institutions and their operation have them­
selves at times been at the center of disagreements, they remain, on balance, 
valuable instruments for the pursuit of national interests. Thus their partici­
pants are likely to continue to work through them and to respect the limits 
that they place on national action even in cases where doing so seems dis­
advantageous.
One further word on the liberal perspective may be in order at this point. 
Thus far, I have treated institutional theory and liberal democratic peace the­
ory as distinct approaches to understanding international relations. In fact, 
however, they are complementary insofar as international institutions and 
liberal democracy are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, liberal demo­
cratic states are more likely to create and maintain international institutions 
than are other types of states. One reason for this is the intrinsic value that 
liberal democracies place on cooperation. Another is the importance as­
signed to the mle of law in such societies. The development of international 
law and organizations is merely the extension of familiar law-governed do­
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mestic processes to the international sphere. On the other hand, interna­
tional institutions will be not only more abundant among liberal democracies 
but also more consequential. Liberal democracies are more likely to regard 
the rules institutions contain as authoritative and binding and thus to treat 
those rules with deference. This further line of argument suggests the exis­
tence of even stronger grounds for expecting a continued high level of 
transatlantic cooperation after the Cold War (Kupchan, 1999).
Finally, as the transformational perspective would emphasize, the United 
States and Europe may have grown through a half century of frequent and 
wide-ranging interactions into convergent ways of thinking about them­
selves, their interests, and one another that reinforce the institutions and lib­
eral values that already dispose them toward cooperation. Externally, they 
have been increasingly bound by the shared goal of enlarging the areas of 
the world that possess functioning market economies and are governed by 
the rule of law. Vis-à-vis one another, in the words of a leading German ob­
server of transatlantic relations, “the distinction between foreign and domes­
tic policy has blurred as [their] societies have interwoven,” a process that 
seems only likely to accelerate with the growth of the internet {New York 
Times, 28 May 2000; see also Guay, 1999).
Of course, the possibility remains that, in the long run, corrosive realist pres­
sures may ultimately prevail over these cooperative tendencies. Nor can one 
guarantee that all the circumstances that currently promote cooperation will 
not change. For example, the relative, if not absolute, degree of transatlantic 
economic interdependence— and thus the consequences of a fundamental 
rupture— could decline as more and more U.S. trade shifts from Europe to 
Asia. As a result, the United States could become increasingly willing to take a 
hard line vis-à-vis Europe in defense of its perceived economic interests.
In addition, there is uncertainty about the implications of the further evo­
lution of the EU. The 1990s witnessed first the completion of a single Euro­
pean market largely free of barriers to the movement of goods, services, cap­
ital, and labor, and then the successful introduction of a true European 
economic and monetary union (EMU) involving a common currency and a 
single central bank, the feasibility of which had long been doubted. Now the 
EU is poised to streamline its internal decision-making processes in prepara­
tion for the accession of new members from Central and Eastern Europe and 
to add a tme capacity for military action.
As a result of these developments, relations with the United States could 
be strained in two somewhat contradictory ways. On the one hand, such sig­
nificant integrative steps would seem not only to evidence the existence of a 
Europe that was more willing and able than ever to assert its independence 
but also to set the stage for drawn-out future conflicts over both economic 
and security policies between more evenly matched rivals. On the other 
hand, problems with the EMU and enlargement could cause the EU to turn
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inward, hampering efforts at transatlantic economic cooperation (Eichen- 
green and Ghironi, 1998).
Policy Implications
In short, the road ahead is unlikely to be an entirely smooth one. Just as 
during the last decade, the transatlantic relationship will encounter frequent 
bumps and the occasional pothole. Thus the generally optimistic picture 
painted above should not be allowed to foster complacency. To the contrary, 
the forward progress of U.S.-European relations will always stand to benefit 
from active management and enlightened leadership. This observation 
seems especially true in view of the fact that some important sources of post­
war U.S.-European cooperation, particularly those emphasized by the realist 
perspective, are no longer present or much reduced. Consequently, the pos­
sibility that misdirected policies— or the absence of policy— could eventually 
lead to a fundamental breach in the relationship, although perhaps small, is 
not negligible. The good news is that the situation is not entirely beyond hu­
man control. Today’s and tomorrow’s leaders have it in their means to take 
steps that can help to preclude an extensive breakdown of cooperation.
What prescriptions follow from the theoretical perspectives considered in 
this paper? Once again, it is necessary to begin by qualifying what can be 
achieved here. It is no more possible to derive highly specific policy guid­
ance from such broadly framed theoretical perspectives than it is to offer de­
tailed predictions about transadantic relations. A tradeoff usually exists be­
tween the range of instances to which a theory might apply and the degree 
to which it can illuminate a specific case. Consequently, perhaps the most 
that can be hoped for are very general guidelines, including an indication of 
the types of conditions and policy instruments to which policy makers 
should devote their attention.
When it comes to offering advice, realism is in one respect the least use­
ful of the three perspectives, since the factors that it emphasizes are the least 
subject to conscious manipulation. There is not much one can do about the 
loss of the unifying Soviet threat or about the relative decline of American 
power vis-à-vis Europe. Nor would it be worth attempting to resurrect the 
Soviet threat or to construct a substitute merely for the sake of preserving al­
lied unity even if one could do so.
Nevertheless, realism can help to suggest the forms of cooperation that are 
more or less possible and sustainable in the altered geopolitical circum­
stances of the post-Cold War era. In the area of security affairs, it makes clear 
that a high level of U.S. involvement in Europe will be more difficult to jus­
tify and thus to sustain than in the past, absent the reemergence of a com­
pelling threat. Consequently, it behooves the Europeans to take the steps 
necessary to become collectively a more equal military partner of the United
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States, one that can bear a greater share of the burdens of regional defense—  
and now peacekeeping— efforts than they have been able to do thus far, and 
it behooves the United States to encourage this process. To be sure, the 
United States may sometimes chafe at having to relinquish the dispropor­
tionate influence over NATO policy that has come with being the dominant 
member of the alliance. But this equalization of U.S. and European roles will 
be compensated for by a commensurate readjustment of their respective re­
sponsibilities and the elimination of lingering European resentments.
Similarly, in the area of economic affairs, realism underscores the impor­
tance of establishing and maintaining a balanced relationship. In the absence 
of a hegemonic power, asymmetrical flows of goods and capital risk prompt­
ing the erection of trade barriers and controls on investment. Indeed, this 
goal would already seem to have been largely achieved, at least in compar­
ison with other bilateral relationships, thereby creating a relatively sound 
foundation for future U.S.-European economic ties.
The liberal perspective offers a different but complementary set of pre­
scriptions. Institutional theory instructs policy makers to be attentive to the 
role that international institutions can play in promoting cooperation. Thus it 
would caution against moving too hastily to abandon or dismantle existing 
international institutions, even if they seem outdated, and would instead un­
derscore the importance of identifying the ways in which they may continue 
to be of use, even if some modifications are necessary. Likewise, while rec­
ognizing that the creation new institutions is not the solution for every thing 
that ails transatlantic relations, it reminds us that they can sometimes help to 
resolve specific sources of conflict. Thus, as noted above, a transatlantic free 
trade agreement would probably not represent any improvement upon the 
WTO. But with traditional trade barriers having been largely eliminated, 
there may be a place for new U.S.-European institutions that could address 
so-called behind-the-border issues, such as differences in government regu­
lation and corporate taxation (Kahler, 1995; Reinicke, 1996).
For its part, liberal democratic peace theory emphasizes the value of pro­
moting the inculcation of liberal values and the establishment democratic in­
stitutions in countries that lack them and preserving them where they al­
ready exist. Liberal democracy seems well-entrenched in the countries 
covered in this analysis. Thus the most immediate prescription that follows 
from this theory is the need to seek to enlarge the “zone of peace” (Ullman, 
1990) within Europe, if only as a means of reducing the likelihood and mag­
nitude of crises and conflicts in neighboring areas that might strain transat­
lantic relations. In fact, Western leaders would seem to have already under­
stood this lesson, judging by the efforts that they have made to promote 
political and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe.
In this regard, the two strands of liberal theory considered in this paper 
come together. Although regional institutions serve a number of purposes,
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they have proven themselves to be among the most useful instruments for 
fostering liberal democracy where it is not already present. This goal has in­
formed some of the most noteworthy NATO initiatives of the past decade, 
such as the PFP, as well as the EU’s more gradual but nevertheless significant 
progress toward strengthening ties with Central and Eastern Europe. Al­
though the potential drawbacks of admitting additional countries into NATO 
and the EU, especially if done so too hastily, should not be minimized, nei­
ther should they be allowed to justify interminable delays in the enlargement 
process.
Perhaps less obvious is the fact that international institutions will also have 
a role to play in preserving the impressive liberal democratic gains that were 
achieved within the existing transatlantic community during the postwar era. 
Here the case of Germany is especially instructive. Although German de­
mocracy may be no less inherently stable than democracy in other West Eu­
ropean countries, it may be potentially more subject to corrosive external 
pressures because of Germany’s central geographical location on the conti­
nent and its heavy dependence on exports. Thus policy makers should bear 
in mind how NATO and other European security structures can help to buffer 
Germany against potentially disruptive security threats, while the EU and the 
WTO can help to ensure access for German products in foreign markets.
Because of the relatively undeveloped nature of the transformation per­
spective, it is perhaps the least capable of generating concrete guidance for 
policy. At a minimum, it is useful for reminding policy makers that national 
beliefs, interests, and even identities are not immutable. Rather, these im­
portant determinants of state policy and international relations are them­
selves malleable and, indeed, somewhat subject to conscious manipulation. 
Thus policy makers eager to sustain transatlantic cooperation should be ever 
on the lookout for ways of fostering common understandings and interests.
Typically, such transformational dynamics are associated with interna­
tional contacts and the flow of people, information, and material resources 
across national boundaries. Such exchanges, moreover, are likely to take 
place in the context of or be promoted by international institutions. Conse­
quently, policy makers should be attentive to— and prepared to exploit—the 
transformational potential of NATO and other transatlantic institutions, even 
if these were established for different reasons and continue to be justified on 
other grounds.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be much more specific at this point, given 
that transformational processes are still poorly understood. Much more re­
search is required in order to clarify the mechanisms through which and the 
conditions under which national perspective, interests, and even identities 
may grow together. Scholarly efforts directed toward this end are likely to be 
well worthwhile, however, because of their substantial potential policy rele­
vance, and not just for the management of transatlantic relations.
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NOTES
1. One need only examine the titles of many of the books that have recently ap­
peared on the subject. See, for example, Coker, 1998; Geipel and Manning, 1996; 
Kaase and Kohut, 1996; Serfaty, 1997; and Weidenfeld, 1996.
2. By anarchy, in this context, we do not mean a state of chaos; international rela­
tions can be quite orderly, even from a realist perspective. Rather, anarchy means a 
lack of hierarchy and, in particular, the absence of any central authority capable of 
enforcing agreements between states or of protecting them if they are threatened or 
actually attacked by one another.
3. The most rigorous presentation of balance of power theory remains Waltz 
(1979). A valuable refinement focuses on the role of threats, rather than power alone, 
in stimulating balancing behavior (Walt, 1987).
4. Indeed, insofar as liberal democratic peace theory emphasizes values as op­
posed to formal domestic institutions, it too falls within this expansive camp.
5. For example, the tariffs (approximately $300 million) that the United States has 
threatened to impose on European products over the banana and beef-hormone dis­
putes would amount to only about one-tenth of 1 percent of the total volume of 
transadantic trade.
6. In 1996, the EU ranked just behind Canada as the leading U.S. partner in mer­
chandise trade ($270 billion in total exports and imports versus $290 billion) (Schott, 
1998: 38-39).
7. In 1998, 44 percent of all U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) was in Europe, 
while 58 percent of all FDI in the United States originated in the EU (Guay, 1999: 82; 
see also Schott 1996: 41 and 44). According to one estimate, trade between parent 
firms and their affiliates on the other side of the Atlantic amounts to one-third of all 
transadantic trade (Schott, 1996: 44).
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